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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
FRED WALKER, 
Plaintiff and ReS"[Jondent, 
VB. 
C. C. BINTZ and SHAW, INC., a 
corporation of the State of Utah, 
Defendarnts OJnd Appellants. 
Case No. 8224 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NAT'URE OF THE CASE 
This action was instituted by the Plaintiff in two 
counts, one for money had and received, and the other 
for breach of contract, and seeking as damages the 
recovery of $1,000.00 earnest money deposit, interest, 
attorney's fees and costs. 
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FACTS 
In 1953, the Defendant, C. C. Bintz, was the owner 
and in possession of a certain parcel of unimproved real 
estate situate in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, com-
monly designated as 5850 Highland Drive, which property 
had been listed for sale by the owner with Shaw, Inc., 
a real estate brokerage firm of which Manford A. Shaw 
was President and one l\1. G. Brixen was an employee. 
On May 11, 1953, tJ:!e Defendant Shaw, Inc., found Fred 
Walker as a prospective ':Purchaser of the property and 
on said date had him execute an "Earnest Money Receipt 
i~d Offer to Purchase" agreement; (Exhibit I). Con-
current with the execution of-the agreement by the Plain~ 
tiff, the sum of $1,000.00 was paid over to the Defendant, 
Shaw, Inc. 
The Earnest Money Receipt contains the following 
provisions : 
"The total purchase price of $30,250.00 shall 
be payable as follows: $1,000.00 which represents 
the aforesaid deposit, receipt of which is hereby 
acknowledged by you; $------------------------ when seller 
approves sale ; $4,000.00 on delivery of deed or 
final contract of sale which shall be on or before 
July 11, 1953, and $500.00 each month commencing 
or more (sic) com1nencing August 11, 1953. Bal-
ance in fu1l on or before J'uly 11, 1956, until t~e 
balance of $25,250.00 together with interest IS 
paid; provided, however, that the buyer at his 
option, at any ti1ne, may pay amounts in excess 
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3 
of the monthly payments upon the unpaid balance, 
subject to the limitations of any mortgage or con-
tract by the buyer herein assumed. Interest at 
5% per annum on the unpaid portions of the 
purchase price to be included in the prescribed 
payments and shall begin as of date of possession 
which shall be on or before when ·aeal is finally 
closed.'' (Emphasis Ours) 
The Earnest Money Agreement further provides as 
follows: 
"We do hereby agree to carry out and fulfill 
the terms and conditions specified above, and the 
seller agrees to furnish good and marketable title 
with abstract to date or at Seller's option a policy 
of title insurance in the name of the purchaser 
and to make final conveyance by warranty deed 
or ·······················-·····-····································-··············· ;" 
On or about June 24, 1953, the Appellants delivered 
an abstract of title to Respondent's Attorney for examin-
ation (R. 116). An opinion was rendered thereon 
which noted various exceptions to the title which were 
objectionable to the Respondent, Walker. The Appellant, 
Shaw, Inc., assured Walker thttt the title was not de-
fective; that the title had been passed upon by competent 
counsel of their own (R. 29); that they would furnish 
Respondent a policy of title insurance in support thereof, 
(R. 117). 
The Defendant secured an Interim Binder of Title 
Insurance from the Utah Savings & Trust Abstract 
Company (Exhibit 3) on or about July 9, 1953, and sub-
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mitted same to Respondent as evidence of title and there-
upon demanded that he execute a Uniform Real Estate 
Contract prepared by Shaw, Inc., and which had already 
been executed by the Appellant Bintz, (Exhibit 9). 
The Respondent then informed Appellants that in 
view of the exceptions contained in the Interim Binder 
of Title Insurance supplied by them, (Exhibit 3) he did 
not consider the title to the property safe to purchase 
and demanded a return of his earnest money deposit, 
(R. 32). 
Defendants never supplied any further evidence of 
title nor did they convey any further information to the 
Plaintiff that any. further steps had or would be taken 
to satisfy his demand for evidence of "clear title," but 
insisted that he pay $4,000.00 and execute the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract (Exhibit 9) on July 11, 1953, (R. 
108). 
Not only had the Appellants failed ~ notify the 
R,espondent of any intention to correct the flaws in the 
title, as disclosed hy an examination of the abstract and 
the interim binder of title insurance, but in fact they 
pleaded in their answer to the complaint that title was 
not defective, (R. 17) and even as late as April 24, 1954, 
the date on which the trial court heard this action Ap-
pellants were still unwilling to admit a defective title, 
(R. 17), as an examination of the bulk of the proceedings 
will disclose. It was not until the filing of this appeal that 
the Appellants abandoned their theory that the title was 
not defective. 
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The Respondent instituted action against the Ap-
pellants and C. C. Bintz counterclaimed, alleging that he 
was able to perform the conditions of the Earnest Money 
Receipt and further alleged the provisions for retention 
of down payment as a forfeiture of liquidated damages; 
and also alleged damages to 'his property, (R. 9-12). 
The trial court found as a matter of fact that the 
Appellant, C. C. Bintz, had failed to furnish evidence of 
marketable title, and further found as a matter of fact 
that the Appellants had never furnished_Respondent with 
anyevidenee of their intention to clear the title, (Findings 
ofFaet) 
Judgment was entered in favor of-Respondent on his 
second count, and reeovery denied upon the Counterelaim 
of the Appellant Bintz, from which judgment this appeal 
is taken. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HOLD THAT THE 
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT WAS NOT A COMPLETE 
CONTRACT. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING 
THAT THE SELLER MUST FURNISH MARKETABLE 
TITLE ON JULY 11, 1953. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN RENDERING 
JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT SHAW. 
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POINT IV~ 
'THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING RE-
COVERY ON THE BINTZ COUNTERCLAIM. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HOLD THAT THE 
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT WAS NOT A COMPLETE 
CONTRACT. 
-It is the Appellants' contention in this case that the 
lower court held that the Earnest Money .Receipt signed 
by Walker and Bintz was not a complete contract. We 
can find no indication of such a position having been 
taken by the district court. The court did . not hold, 
however, that' the Earnest Money Receipt was the same 
agreement as the Uniform Real Estate Agreement which 
was contemplated as a result of said Earnest Money 
Receipt Agreement .. It will be seen that the Earnest 
Money Receipt Agreement requires the following: 
''That the Seller furnish go"Odand marketable 
title 'vith ·Abstract to date or at Seller's option a 
Policy of Title Insurance in the name of the Pur-
chaser and to make final conveyance by Warranty 
Deed.'' (Exhibit I) 
In the Uniform Real Estate Contract (Exhibit 9) 
contemplated as the final agreement by the parties, it 
states with regards to· the title as follows: 
"The Seller upon receiving payments herem 
reserved to be paid at the times and in the manner 
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above mentioned agrees to execute and deliver to 
the Buyer or Assigns a good and sufficient War-
ranty Deed conveying the title to the above des-
cribed premises, free and clear of all encum-
brances except as herein mentioned and except as 
may have accrued by or through the acts or neglect 
of the Buyer, and to furnish at his expense an 
Abstract of Title. or Policy of Title Insurance, at 
the option of the. Seller, brought up to date at the 
time of the sale or at the time of delivery of deed, 
at the option of the Buyer." 
It will be seen by an examination of these two in-
struments that while the general terms as to payment 
may be the same, the terms with regard to when evidence 
of titre is to be furnished are different. The Uniform 
Real Estate Contract (Exhibit 9) gives the Seller the 
option to. furnish marketable title either at the time of 
the sale or upon delivery of the deed after payment is 
made. The Earnest Money Receipt Agreement states. that 
the Seller is to furnish marketable title or title insurance: 
to date and we are unable to lend any credence to Appel-
lants' contention that "to date'' does not mean ''to date'' 
at all but four years later; and when the function of the 
earnest Money Receipt is construed in the context of the 
parties negotiations, it is apparent that the Earnest 
Money Receipt Agreement is often made before the 
Buyer has had time to examine the title and the assump-
tion is that he will have such time before the final Uni-
form Real Estate Contract is made. 
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POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING 
THAT THE SELLER MUST FURNISH MARKETABLE 
TITLE ON JULY 11, 1953. 
The Appellants contend that the term ''to date" is 
ambiguous and misleading because there are several 
dates involved in the Agreement Quoting from Page 10 
of Defendants' Brief, "On July 11, 1953, the additional 
$4,000.00 was to ·be paid." An examination of the actual 
context of the Earnest Money Receipt Agreement reveals 
that the select!on of this date by the trial Judge was not 
so capricious. Quoting from the Earnest Money Receipt 
Agreement, (Exhibit I), "4,000.00 on delivery of deed 
or final contract of sale which shall be· on or before JUly 
11, 1953." In other words, this date represented the date 
upon which the final sale was to be consumated. 
We are quite inti'iguted by the Appellants' curious 
interpretation of the term "to date" which, as we have 
previously indicated,- according to them, does not mean 
"to date" at all, but means four years later. This interpre-
tation did not apparently occur to them until this appeal 
because they did furnish an abstract of title soon after 
the Earnest Money Receipt Agreement was made w:hich 
was a strange thing to do if their duty to do so did not 
arise until four years later. Apparently from their 
present interpretation of the contract, furnishing the 
abstract of title was for purposes of information only. 
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In the case of Woodard vs. Allen, 1 U t 2nd 221, 265 
Pac 2nd 398; cited by Appellants, the case involved an 
agreement, apparently a Uniform Real Estate Contract, 
where the Plaintiff agreed to convey by Warranty Deed 
when the payment was received. 
Needless to say, the agreement concerning the title 
are greatly different in the Earnest Money Receipt 
Agreement and the Uniform Real Estate Contract which 
difference was pointed out under Point No. 1. 
Appellants also argue under Point B of their brief 
that if marketable title was required to ·he furnished on 
July 11, 1953, the Seller was entitled to a reasonable time 
tliereafter to perfect his title. We cannot agree· with this 
contention .. It should be recalled that after the objections 
to the abstract were raised and called to their attention, 
they belatedly submitted an interim binder of title in-
surance (Exhibit 3) listing numerous exceptions which 
we1·e previously pointed out to them. 
Actually, they had exercised their option to select 
between an abstract of title or title insurance by sub-
mitting the abstract of title to the Plaintiff and Respon-
dent. 
It is a general rule in this country that where a 
contract calls for the Vendor to furnish an abstract of 
title showing marketable title, the abstract itself must 
show that the Vendor is the owner of record. In 55 Am. 
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Jur. 734; Vendor and Purchaser, Sec. 297, it is stated: 
"Under a contract which imposes upon the 
Vend or the duty of furnishing an abstract showing 
good title in himself, the burden is upon the 
Vendor to show by abstract that the title to the 
property is in accordance with his covenants. If 
the contract calls for an abstract showing a good 
title or a Inarketable title in the Vendor, nothing 
less than an abstract of this character will satisfy 
the condition no matter what the Vendor's real 
title may be. Where the Vendor agrees to furnish 
an abstract of title it has been held the abstract · 
must on its face or by reference show a good title.'' 
In Hami).ton vs. Binger, 162 Kansas 415, 176 Pac. 
2nd 552, at page 558 it is held: 
- "In our consideration of this subject we 
proceed upon the premise that where a contract 
for sale and purchase of land provides a Vendor 
shall furnish the Vendee with an Abstract showing 
marketable title, the Abstract must show on its 
face a good title in the Vendor, (55 Am. Jur. 734; 
Sec. 297, Thompson on Abstracts and Titles 14, 
Sec. 9) and the showing of such a title in the Ab-
stract is a condition precedent to be performed 
by the Vendor before he will be permitted to 
recover any balance claimed by him to be due on 
a contract for the sale of real estate, (66 C. J. 
957, 'Sec. 644; Thompson on Abstracts and Titles, 
12, Sec. 8; Patton on Title, 119, Sec. 25) ." 
See also 7 A. L. R. 1166 et seq., and 52 A. L. R. 1460 
et seq. 
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· • :· ·The proceedings in the lower court concerning the 
marketability of title reveal that· the abstract· did not 
,show on its face or by reference that there was. a good 
title in the Vendor, and under the rule enunciated above 
-~he Vendee .is not requir~d to accept any proceedings 
'outsid.e the record to make the title good even if that 
proceeding does so, ·7 .A. L. R. 1168. Therefore, how can 
Appellants argue that they were entitled to a reasonable 
time after the above indicated date to correct the defects 
where such corrections would have had to be. outside 
the record and in violation of .this rple. 
However, even if .Appellants were· entitled to a 
reasonable time after the defects were .·pointed out to 
them to correct the defects by proceedings outside the 
record, they had forfeited that right. 
After the defects were pointed out to .Appellants, 
they did nothing to correct the situat~on except to tender 
an interim binder of title insurance which listed numerous 
exceptions destroying the marketability of title, (Exhibit 
3), which included many of the exceptions listed by 
Re.spondent's counseL 
Competent testimony at the trial indicated .~hat the 
title was not insurable '(R. 22-42). 
The .Appellants have never conceded, even to this 
date, that the title was unmarketable although they have 
"assumed for the purpose of this appeal" (.Appellants 
Brief) that it was and is unmarketable. 
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E'\l'en if they were entitled to a reasonable time after 
notification to correct the defects noted, can they ·stand 
back and deny that at all times the title is unmarketable 
forcing the Vendee to bring them ·to trial on the issue 
and when the title is found unmarketable, then say they 
are entitled to additional time to correct itY This is a 
situation 'where the Vendor of necessity would have to 
make an election as t(} his the0:ry. Either he would have 
to admit that the title was defective and indicate a will-
ingness to correct it or to stand solely on the theory that 
the title was marketable. Otherwise, it would allow the 
Vendor to speculate on the outcome of the trial on the 
title's marketability at the expense of the Vendee. In 55 
Am. JUr. 722, Sec 272, it is stated: 
"Moreover, it seems to be the general rule 
where time is not of the essence of the contract, 
the Vendor has a reasona:ble time after defects are 
pointed out to remedy them. If d,efects in the title 
are poilnted out by the V erulee OJrl)(], the Vendor 
submits the evidence of title without having cor-
~ected such defects, he is not entitled to additioool 
time for this purpose." (57 A. L. R. 15-18) 
(E·mphasis 'Ours). 
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POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN RENDERING 
JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT SHAW, INC. 
The Appellants argue that Judgment should not have 
been rendered against the Defendant Shaw, Inc., because 
he was an agent and not a party to the contract. The 
exact legal relationship of a real estate agent with regard 
to his duties to the Buyer and Seller has never been too 
carefully delineated. Whether he is the agent of the 
Seller or the agent of both the Buyer and Seller is a 
question that the courts are in conflict on. In any event, 
it should be recalled that the $1,000.00 earnest money was 
delivered to him personally and only fifty per cent of 
such sum was paid over to Appellant C. C. Bintz and fifty 
per cent of said sum was retained by Appellant Shaw, 
Inc., ( R. 133). 
In 2 Am. Jur. 2G4, Agency, Sec 335, it is stated: 
"An ~gent to whom money has been paid for his 
principal through error or under circumstances 
existing at the time of payment that would entitle 
the payor to recover it back from the principal, the 
principal is immediately liable to the payor for the 
money so received so long as it remains in his 
hands and there has been no alteration in the 
situation of agent toward principal in relationship 
to such payment," and in Sec. 340, page 286, 
supra it is stated: However, it is to be noted that 
where a part payrnent has been made to Vendor's 
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agent and is still in his. hands the purchasers may 
recover it from the agent if the circumstances are 
such that he would be entitled to receive it from 
the principal," citing 134 Am. State Rep. 582; 1 
105 Me. 471, 75 A. 43. :~~ 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING RE-
COVERY ON THE BINTZ COUNTER-CLAIM. 
The Respondent cannot agree with the contention 
that he breached the contract. On the contrary, from the 
facts developed in the case, it appears conclusive that the 
contract was breached when the Appellants failed to 
supply evidence of marketable title as required by the 
terms of the Earnest Money Agreement and in further 
failing to indicate that the title could or would be cor-
rected. 
A review of the testimony will show that Walker 
did not repudiate the contract until after he had afforded 
the Appellant the additional opportunity of furnishing 
evidence of marketable title in the form of title insurance, 
and it was only after an interim binder of title insurance 
was tendered setting forth numerous exceptions to the 
condition of the title (Exhibit 3) that Walker was com-
peled· to seek a recovery in this action. 
This being so, the Appellants were not the agrieved 
parties and consequently could not maintain an action 
for their on failure to perform. The rule enunciated in 
l 
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the Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 1948, Supple-
mental, Section 318, as set forth in Appellants' Brief 
seems to lend its entire weight to the Respondent's theory 
in this action. 
It should be noted that when the Respondent invited 
Appellants' attention to the title defects as disclosed by 
an examination of the abstract, the only evidence sub-
sequently furnished plaintiff regarding the marketability 
of title was the interim binder of title insurance 
·(Exhibit 3) and conearrent with the delivery thereof, 
Appellants demanded that Respondent execute a pre-
viously prepared Uniform Real Estate Contract and pay 
the sum of $4,000.00 to them, and at no time did they 
admit that the title was unmarketable or indicate tliat 
they had made any arrangements to perfect title to the 
property in accordance with the Plaintiff's desires, (R. 
22). 
In 55 Am. Jur. 908, Vendor and Purchaser, 
Sec 515, it is stated: "As to executory contracts, 
it is the general rule that a Vendor in default in 
the payment of taxes or the discharge of an en-
cumbrance, under a provi~;ion explicitly obligat-
ing him to pay or discharge same, cannot main-
tain an action at law to recover purchase money 
thereafter or simultaneously coming due." Citing 
99 :Mont. 583, 44 Pac 2nd 1064, 101 A. L. R. 520. 
The testimony adduced at the trial was very vague 
and ambiguous as to what damage, if any, had been suH-
tained by Bintz as a result of the contract failure. 
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Manford Shaw testified with respect to the condition 
of- the property: ''It wasn't anything a little elbow grease 
and time and effort would have not cured and restored 
to its original position of manicure.'' (R. 123). 
The Appellant Bintz testified that he had horses 
running at large on the premises and that they had full 
access to the property (R. 131). Therefore, it is easy 
to conclude that if the property had been damaged by 
reason of loosing its manicure, the fact that Bintz per-
mitted horses to run at large upon the property could 
easily have caused the damages complained of. 
Manford Shaw further testified: 
"Q. Have you sold any property out in that area 
during the last year~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what did the price seen to be,-and what 
did the price seem to be, did the price seem 
to be just about the same as it has been for 
the past several years~ 
A. Well, no, better than it was the last several 
years. It seems to be about the same as a year 
ago, or a few months ago. We are dealing 
quite a bit in that area." (R. 122) 
The Appellant Bintz further testified that he had 
listed the property for sale in the form of 10 estate lots 
·ranging in price from $3500.00 to $4950.00 each, (R.132), 
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which would appear to quite conclusively establish the 
fact that the owner Bintz did not acknowledge any de-
preciation in the value of this land. 
From the foregoing testimony, it app~ars quite clear 
that Binb sustained no damages by reason of the con-
tract's failure and in any event, should not recover for 
damages occasioned by his own failure to perform the 
conditions of the contract. 
CONCLUSION 
It will be seen from the facts of this case that the 
Earnest Money Receipt Agreement required the Vendor 
to furnish to the Vendee evidence of marketable title 
on or before the final contract of sale. This was not done 
and that the only efforts made by the Vendor after the 
defects were pointed out to him by the Vendee to correct 
the situation was to supply an interim binder of title 
insurance containing as exceptions many of the same ob-
jections that the Vendee had raised. The Vend or ada-
mantly insisted that the title was marketable not only 
at the time of the negotiation of the parties but also up 
until the time that this appeal was taken. It was clearly 
an attempt on the part of the Vend or to foist upon the 
Vendee an unmarketable title. To this action, the Vendee 
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strenuously objected, asking for the return of his money 
which request was refused 'by the Vend or and which 
actions necessitated the bringing of this suit. We clearly 
feel that the law enunciated in this case would require 
that the Supreme Court sustain the decision of the lower 
court and affirm the judgment rendered in favor of the 
Respondent herein. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRANT H. WALL 
JOHN E. STONE 
Attorneys for Respondent, 
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